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Guilds, Product Quality and Intrinsic Value.  
Towards a History of Conventions? 
Bert De Munck ∗ 
Abstract: »Zünfte, Produktqualität und intrinsischer Wert: In Richtung einer 
Geschichte der Konventionen?«. This article addresses the issue of conventions 
from the perspective of the early modern guilds’ regulations related to product 
quality. Starting from the ideas of François Eymard-Duvernay one specific 
convention is identified: ‘intrinsic value’ (i.e., value related to the raw materi-
als used). This convention enabled guild-based artisans to locate product qual-
ity in their political standing and, hence, was intimately linked to the (urban) 
political context. While this may be familiar to the ideas on ‘justification’ of 
Boltanski and Thévenot, an historical analysis reveals fundamental conceptual 
issues. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, both the convention of in-
trinsic value and the guilds’ power to define product quality became obsolete 
because of (among other things) epistemological transformations. While intrin-
sic value as a convention was connected to the idea of matter possessing mys-
terious, religious and creative powers in itself, natural philosophers naturalized 
matter from the seventeenth century on. As a result, value may have become 
synonymous with either the products’ place in a taxonomy of products or the 
meaning produced in discourses external to the product. Further research 
should in any case take fundamental epistemic shifts and shifts in the subject-
object relationships into consideration. 
Keywords: conventions, guilds, product quality, repertoires of evaluation, jus-
tification, urban history. 
 
The ‘economics of convention’ have been of great use for a better understand-
ing of economic practices and choices. In general, the theories of conventions 
have helped to reveal and problematize the field of tension between structural-
ist and rational choice approaches. In their attempt to confront and reconcile 
sociological and economic views, the scholars involved have sought for a mid-
dle ground between theories based upon predetermined and will-less subjects 
on the one hand and rational and utility-maximising individuals on the other 
(Dupuy et al. 1989; Orléan 1989, 1994; Batifoulier 2001; Eymard-Duvernay 
2006). As such, convention theorists have shown that economic choices and 
actions are based upon conventions, which may be defined as implicit (com-
mon) rules or knowledge, collective representations, shared models of judge-
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ment or common interpretative contexts (see Biencourt, Chaserant & Rebéri-
oux, 216). However, these theories continue to be haunted by fundamental 
conceptual problems, starting with the very definition of conventions. To what 
extent are conventions synonymous with (arbitrary) regularities or implicit 
knowledge? How do they connect to the ‘rational’ on the one hand and the 
‘cultural’ or the ‘institutional’ on the other? And how do rules, politics and 
power intervene? (Recent perspectives and references in Batifoulier; Eymard-
Duvernay et al. 2006; Stanziani 2005, 2006) Some scholars have tried to define 
conventions from ideas on bounded rationality and game theoretical models. 
Others have referred to ‘collective (cognitive) dispositions’ and used the con-
cept of ‘(collective) apprenticeship’ in order to understand the emergence and 
dynamics of conventions (Favereau 1989, 1994; Salais 1989). In a way, this is 
still very much the difference between an economic and a sociological (or 
cultural) approach – which indicates that the integration is unfinished.  
One of the main issues is the need for a diachronical perspective. Can the 
emergence and transformation of conventions and institutions be explained by 
the repeated character of games of coordination and cooperation on a market 
(while cultural elements are endogenized), or should values, culture and history 
be seen as exogenous elements? (Biggart & Beamish 2003; Eymard-Duvernay 
et al. 2006; Swedberg 2006) Most scholars now seem to admit that exogenous 
shocks and irregularities are involved and that a historical perspective is needed 
(e.g. Batifoulier & Larquier 2001, 126; Larquier, Abecassis & Batifoulier 2001, 
157; Boyer 2006, 54-55). Moreover, after an initial focus on bounded and 
cognitive rationality and game theory, the last decades have witnessed a return 
to the interpretative and political perspective of Luc Boltanski and Laurent 
Thévenot (Eymard-Duvernay et al. 2006; Boyer 2006; Biencourt, Chaserant & 
Rebérioux 2001; Batifoulier & Thévenon 2001). For Boltanski and Thévenot 
(1989, 1991) conventions were fundamentally linked to political philosophy 
and representations of the common good – which were historically contingent. 
The basic idea in their standard work De la justification. Les economies de la 
grandeur is that coordination and evaluation involved justification. While 
judging persons and things implies ranking them according to some basic ideas 
on what is good and just in a certain ‘monde’ or ‘cité’, evaluations are to be 
explicitly justified referring to the common good in the event of disagreements 
and disputes. Each convention will consequently have a political dimension. 
But here again, a historical perspective is needed. While Boltanski and 
Thévenot have identified six ‘cités’ or conventions, the roots of which were 
mostly to be found in pre-industrial times, other scholars have found new forms 
of worth in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, such as the ‘green’ worth, 
the ‘information’ worth and the ‘connectionist’ worth (Lafaye & Thévenot 
1993; Thévenot, Moody & Lafaye 2000; Boltanski & Chiapello 1999; 
Thévenot 2002, 189). So how do ‘conventions’ come about, change and disap-
pear?  
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In order to shed light on this, I will in this article confront the theories of 
conventions to the recent historiography on the early modern guilds (with an 
obvious bias to my own work on the Southern Netherlands), which can be seen 
as the ‘premodern’ economic institutions par excellence (see esp. Epstein & 
Prak 2008). Linking up with the political perspective on product quality of 
François Eymard-Duvernay (1989, 1994; also Favereau, Biencourt & Eymard-
Duvernay 2002; Stanziani 2003, 2005, 2006), I will examine a premodern 
convention (intrinsic value) and how it transformed at the end of the ancien 
regime. As guilds are said to have solved problems related to information 
asymmetries and uncertainty in the context of thin and underdeveloped mar-
kets, they provide for an excellent case study of how problems of coordination 
are solved, how cooperation, coordination and competition were balanced and 
– last but not least – how objects and actors were evaluated. While guilds had 
firm-like functions such as collective bargaining and delegated monitoring 
(Pfister 2008), they are renowned for their rules and institutional mechanisms 
related to product quality (Gustafsson 1987). In guilds, a rather specific ‘savoir 
collectif’ regarding product quality and technical knowledge was at play (De 
Munck 2007). While this was intimately linked to the (urban) political context, 
it fundamentally transformed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  
Above all, guilds enable to develop a genuine historical and political per-
spective (see Farr 2000 for a historical introduction and additional references). 
The history of guilds provides for a privileged entry into the relationship of 
conventions with habits, routines and customs on the one hand and formal rules 
and institutions on the other. One of the questions to haunt theorists is whether 
rules and institutions are based upon conventions or the other way around. One 
could even ask whether there is a place for ‘conventions’ between these two 
intimately related realms at all (Bessy 2002; Stanziani 2006b). In the first part 
of this article it will be shown that rules and institutions are based upon pre-
existing routines and customs. The formalization of these routines and the 
institutionalization of rules was the result of demographic, economic and po-
litical shifts which brought about a strain on face-to-face-relations and trust, but 
it cannot be explained from the perspective of the so-called ‘new institutional 
economics’ alone. While conflicts and power were important elements, discus-
sions on the legitimacy of guild-related rules focused on the definition of prod-
uct quality. In the second part of this article, I will argue that one specific con-
vention can be identified. I claim that ‘intrinsic value’ (the value of the raw 
material used) was a broadly shared and very important convention in the urban 
and guild-based context of the late medieval and early modern period. This 
convention cannot be framed in the categories of Boltanski and Thévenot 
(1991), which fail to capture historical reality adequately – perhaps because 
they project a contemporary perspective upon the distant past. A historical 
analysis instead reveals a fundamental shift across the ‘conventions’ or 
‘worlds’ as they are currently defined.  
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From the seventeenth century on, ‘intrinsic value’ tends to become discre- 
dited as a convention, as a result of guild-based artisans losing political and 
ideological credibility and, hence, losing grip on the definition of product qual-
ity (De Munck 2007b, 2008). What comes to the fore, however, is not only a 
new ‘cité’ but another epistemic context. Zeroing in on intrinsic value as a 
convention reveals that the guilds becoming discredited was not only the result 
of economic or political transformations in a traditional sense. Neither prole-
tarianization and the industrial revolution nor processes of state formation 
sufficiently capture what was at stake. Intrinsic value as a convention rather 
became obsolete because of epistemological transformations related to the so-
called scientific revolution and enlightened thinking. As a consequence, the 
long term perspective adopted in this article suggests that the identification of 
different ‘conventions’ or ‘mondes’ may not be sufficient. In the third part I 
will argue that the nature, and hence the very definition of what a convention 
might be, has changed over time. Starting from ideas familiar to Michel Fou-
cault, Michel Callon and Bruno Latour, I will tackle the broader issue of mod-
ernization processes and the involvement of intellectuals and scientists in the 
construction thereof. My ultimate point is that these processes have had an 
enormous impact on economic theories and practices in general and on the 
demise of the urban-based artisans’ ‘conventions’ in specific – up to and in-
cluding even our current views on ‘conventions’.  
1. Conventions versus Institutions 
Economic historians studying guilds tend to understand their rules and institu-
tional mechanisms as solutions to a pre-existing economic problem. Collective 
bargaining and delegated monitoring are said to have lowered information and 
other transaction costs. The guilds’ labour market monopsony is considered to 
have increased investment in training – as it excluded free riders and stimulated 
both masters and apprentices to enter into apprenticeship contacts (Epstein 
2008). The existence of a labour market monopsony may have stimulated mas-
ters to invest in training in its own right, but Stephan R. Epstein (1998) has 
suggested that both fixed term to serve and registration fees and end term re-
wards for apprentices moreover served to prevent apprentices from absconding 
and hence ensured masters that they could recover the cost of training by pay-
ing wages below the marginal product of labour. While guilds very often sim-
ply prohibited employing apprentices who had not finished their apprenticeship 
term (again guaranteeing a certain return on investment for masters) appren-
tices could be protected against exploitation. Maximum numbers of apprentices 
and the existence of standardized master pieces may have had the effect that 
apprentices learned more and could foresee what they would earn in advance – 
stimulating apprentices as well to invest in training (compare De Munck 
2011a). 
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From the perspective of product quality guilds are deemed to have solved 
problems of information asymmetry. While the obligation to serve a fixed term 
for apprentices and to make a standardized master piece for prospective mas-
ters guaranteed a certain product quality ex ante, product standardizations and 
workshop searches enabled ex post sanctioning of product quality. In exten-
sion, product quality was communicated to customers (or merchants) either 
face-to-face or by means of collective hall marks (Gustafsson 1987; Epstein 
2008; De Munck 2007b, 2008, 2011a). This distinction already suggests that 
problems related to product quality could be solved formally as well as infor-
mally, but reducing late medieval and early modern processes of institutionali-
zation to the need to solve economic problems would be mistaken. Up to the 
sixteenth century at least, guilds were a type of brotherhoods in which devo-
tional practices and egalitarian ideals took centre stage next to economic bene-
fits and calculation (De Munck 2009a, 2010c). Entering the group was not a 
‘game’ in which members received the benefits of the collective in return for a 
certain investment in terms of entrance fees. New members were either born 
into the group (as sons of masters) or they were socialized into the group via an 
apprenticeship term with an established master. This apprenticeship term in-
volved both acquiring technical knowledge and adopting certain values. These 
values may have been related to a certain trustworthiness in an economic sense, 
next to religious and cultural ideals and principles, but reducing them to mere 
honesty and morality would imply that product quality was an unproblematic 
and natural characteristic of products. Instead, we should see apprenticeship as 
a process in which not only technical knowledge was acquired (next to cultural 
values) but some basic ideas on product quality as well. 
When the Antwerp diamond cutters requested the city authorities the per-
mission to erect a guild in 1582, they distinguished between outsiders who 
made inferior products and insiders who made the right products because they 
were in the trade from childhood and ‘had exercised in the art since their early 
days’ (De Munck 2011a, 244). When the guild was finally erected, product 
quality was not defined: the guild board assumed that those in the trade knew 
what was meant with phrases like ‘well and carefully cut’, because they were 
supposed to act ‘out of love for the noble stones and for the honour of the city’. 
Documents like these suggest that apprenticeship was a process of interiorizing 
certain conventions related to product quality, just as convention theorists have 
suggested. The erection of a guild of gold and silversmiths, and hence the pre-
scription of fixed terms to serve and standardized master pieces, came along 
with lengthy rules on the origin of silver, the alloy, and a broad range of mea- 
sures against fraud and deceit. This ordinance as well may at first sight be 
broached from the perspective of the problem of information asymmetry, but 
this does not prevent the eventual convention to apply being the result of an 
arbitrary choice (De Munck 2011a). 
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Should the body of a diamond be crystal clear or would a ‘birthmark’ or a 
shade of colour have an added value? Is a diamond to be cut and polished per-
fectly symmetrical or would some irregularities be valued in their own right? It 
all appears to be a matter of ‘pure’ convention. However, the institutionaliza-
tion of conventions happened in the context of fierce economic and political 
conflicts. In Antwerp, guilds sought to define more closely who could be mem-
ber of the group or not in the course of the long sixteenth century. While Ant-
werp guilds could decide ad hoc who would be member up until the fifteenth 
century – they only had to inform the urban authorities who someone was when 
accepted – a fixed term to serve was introduced in most guilds somewhere 
between about 1450 and 1550. Moreover, between the last decades of the fif-
teenth century and the first decades of the seventeenth, a standardized master 
piece was introduced for all those who wanted to become master (and some-
times for those who wanted to become journeyman). Notwithstanding very 
different chronologies, most guilds in the Southern Netherlands and beyond 
would seem to have experienced a similar transition in the long run. My re-
search on Antwerp suggests that this process was related to demographic ex-
pansion, which put a strain on face-to-face-mechanisms. It cannot have been a 
coincidence that the Antwerp population at the same time quadrupled between 
the end of the fifteenth century and the third quarter of the sixteenth. In addi-
tion, this demographic transition came along with changing labour relations in 
general and with outsiders starting to employ apprentices and journeymen 
themselves – without being a regular master – in specific. Introducing fixed 
terms to serve and standardized master pieces clearly intended to exclude en-
trepreneurs who had not trained properly (De Munck 2009a, 2010a, 2011a). 
As a result, this was not a matter of simply guaranteeing product quality to 
customers. While the argument used to exclude so-called intruders was often 
the superior quality of products made by guild members as opposed to the 
products of the outsiders, these conflicts involved the power to define what 
product quality was. Most founding ordinances of guilds (i.e., the first written 
rules) defined entry rules and product quality at the same time – which was 
clearly a political process. To the extent that it was a bottom up process, estab-
lishing a guild boiled down to recognizing the superiority of an established 
group of masters’ view on product quality. In most core regions in Europe 
these masters at the same time claimed or possessed a large degree of political 
clout. In the Southern Netherlands, for example, they held seats in the urban 
magistracy or at least a broader council up until the end of the ancien régime 
(exceptions left out) (Prak 2006). Moreover, these masters consequently re-
ferred to the common good of the city when claiming and defending their la-
bour market monopsony and their rules related to product quality. As to en-
trance to the group, the first requirement for prospective masters was typically 
being a burgher of the city in which the guild was established. Immigrants had 
to buy “burghership” (citizenship) and swear loyalty to the city before they 
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could become master at all (De Munck & Winter 2011). So product quality was 
indeed a political issue, just as the theories of Boltanski, Thévenot, Eymard-
Duvernay and others imply. The conventions as they come down to us, are the 
result of historical processes in which power relations are involved.  
However, this is not to say that the models of Boltanski and Thévenot can 
simply be projected upon the late medieval and early modern guilds. While 
economists and sociologists often tend to connect guilds to relations of prox-
imity and face-to-face-networks in which trust is produced (‘convention do-
mestique’), historians are perfectly well aware that guilds very often sold stan-
dardized products in wider markets with a large degree of anonymity in which 
trust is produced through the products’ standards and the communication 
thereof with trade marks, packaging and the like – which could perfectly well 
be framed in the so-called ‘convention industrielle’ (Deceulaer 1998; Deceu-
laer & Jacobs 1998). As a consequence, guild-based masters could adhere to 
different conventions at the same time, which could in turn be connected to 
different market segments and the concomitant production structures and la-
bour relations. In extension, guilds could be linked to the so-called ‘monde 
civique’, in which formal rules related to apprenticeship, membership and 
product standards served to protect and represent an ideal of solidarity and 
equality and the attainment of a collective goal.  
However, reducing the issue of conventions to a question of market seg-
ments and collective action would be mistaken altogether. On the one hand, 
guilds working in different market segments could perfectly well adhere to one 
and the same political philosophy – as for example republican values or Antony 
Black’s ‘guild ethos’. In his classic book Guilds & state (first published as 
Guilds & civil society) Black starts from a distinction between a ‘guild ethos’ 
based on values such as friendship and mutual aid and ‘civil society’, based on 
liberal ideas about personal freedom, legal equality and individual indepen- 
dence. His central point is that a long term transformation, in which a modern 
civil society gradually replaced a guild ethos, is hard to find. Instead, what we 
call civil society today – a set of social organisations freely accessible by indi-
viduals and relatively independent from the state – is said to have existed since 
the twelfth century (in towns) and to have evolved alongside and intertwined 
with the guilds’ values for centuries (Black 1984, 2009; Schilling 1988). On the 
other hand, a process of standardization and institutionalization can be identi-
fied across guilds and market segments (De Munck 2010a, 2011a). Up to a 
certain degree, institutionalization and product standardization seem to have 
been related processes from a historical perspective. While defining product 
quality went hand in glove with defining membership of the group, conflicts 
and changing power relations explain processes of institutionalisation and 
standardization. Hence, the need for a fresh look at the connection between 
conventions and the political context. What conventions were chosen and how 
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were they justified? To what extent were conventions arbitrary and how were 
they related to political philosophy? 
2. Intrinsic Value as a Convention and Beyond 
In order to understand the early modern guilds’ conventions adequately, we 
should first of all realize that product standardization mostly involved some 
sort of ‘intrinsic value’. What the guilds guaranteed with their seals and trade 
marks was, typically, the nature and the characteristics of the raw materials 
used. In textiles, they referred to the origin and quality (including preparatory 
stages) of the fibres used; in metal trades to the origin, alloy and purity of the 
silver and tin used; in leather trades to the origin and quality (again including 
preparation) of the leather used; and so on (De Munck 2007b, 2008, 2010a). 
Although durability may have been involved in some cases, ‘intrinsic value’ 
could be seen as a ‘pure’ convention, for why favouring ‘intrinsic quality’ 
instead of design, decoration or the shape of a product? And why favouring 
silver and tin instead of other scarce ores? However, for the guild-based mas-
ters involved, the choice for intrinsic value was not an arbitrary one. Notwith-
standing apprenticeship terms and master pieces, guilds could never make sure 
that their skills and products were superior to those of outsiders. Masters or 
urban authorities not seldom favoured the skills of immigrants, because they 
were acquainted with new and innovative techniques and product forms (Reith 
1994, 2006; Epstein 2004; De Munck 2004a; Belfanti 2004). In this context, 
stressing intrinsic value instead of skills or acquaintance with product forms 
enabled these artisans to link product quality to their political status. As guild 
rules and trade marks guaranteed that silver was made according to the proper 
alloy, that tin ware did not contain too much lead, that the proper leather and 
wood was used and so forth, product quality was not guaranteed by the quality 
of the artisanal skills applied. What guaranteed product quality was trustwor-
thiness, a moral quality. This moral quality was in turn connected to the identi-
fication of a local master with the common good of the guild and the city – 
among other things by the obligation for masters to be a burgher of the city in 
question.  
Looking upon the guilds’ economic and cultural practices closely it becomes 
clear that product quality was deliberately linked to the city as a political con-
text. While guilds carried along visual references to their products and instru-
ment in public processions and parades, their hall marks to be stamped on their 
products explicitly referred to the city’s coat of arms. Hall marks in Antwerp 
often referred to the Antwerp hand or the typical rhomb-shaped fortress. Hall 
marks in Nuremberg referred to the Nuremberg shield, with half of the double-
headed eagle in a golden field on the left and three bends on the right (De 
Munck 2004b, 2009b, 2009c). From this perspective, the choice for intrinsic 
value as the leading convention becomes a rational one at least for the artisans 
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involved. But intrinsic value was also an obvious choice from the perspective 
of the leading economic and political theories of the fifteenth through the se-
venteenth centuries. In mercantilism, the wealth of a nation or a prince was 
linked to the amount of bullion on its territory. In more advanced theories, this 
applies not only to bullion but to raw materials as well (Magnusson 2003). 
While tinsmiths on the continent favoured English tin as a raw material, the 
prosperity of drapery depended upon the availability of English (or Spanish) 
wool, while good quality silk was associated with Asia and (later) Italy, fur 
with Russia and (northern) North America, cotton with India and so on (e.g. 
Munro 2005). 
In historiography, mercantilism has mostly been linked to the strategies of 
strong central states such as France (e.g. Minard 1998), but projecting it onto 
the city as the relevant political context automatically results in the primacy of 
intrinsic value – i.e. the value of the raw materials used – for the guilds. For the 
prosperity of urban industries and cities as well, the availability of raw materi-
als was of the utmost importance, so adopting strategies and discourses geared 
towards ‘intrinsic value’ was an obvious choice. Still, the mercantilist theories 
may in turn have been related to the epistemological context in a broader sense. 
Up until the seventeenth century ‘nature’ was not seen as dead and passive 
matter out of which something valuable could be manufactured instrumentally. 
For natural philosophers, both naturalia and artificialia provided access to the 
book of nature or to the ultimate truth of god (Daston and Park 1998; Daston 
2004). When creating the world, God had, as it were, left his signature in mat-
ter, as a result of which deciphering the signs led to his wisdom. For artisans 
this may have implied that agency (or creativity) was not only situated in their 
skills and embodied knowledge, but in the raw materials they used as well. 
According to Pamela Smith (2000a, 2000b, 2004) manufacturing was not 
unlike alchemy up until the seventeenth century. It implied a mystic encounter 
between two morally charged ‘bodies’, the result of which was a sort of 
unleashing the creative powers of the raw materials involved. After all, late 
medieval and early modern artisans often knew how to create certain ‘effects’ 
without really comprehending the ‘natural laws’ involved (Mokyr 2002).  
So both these ‘mysteries of the trade’ and the ‘choice’ for ‘intrinsic value’ 
cannot be understood without considering the religious and cultural context 
these artisans worked in. Guido Guerzoni has shown that humanistic discus-
sions on the idea of liberalitas included reflections on the transfer of material 
goods and the virtue of spending money and investing it in gifts and luxury 
items while carefully balancing the material goods and the magnificentia of the 
spender (Guerzoni 1999; Jeggle 2010, 37). While this also suggests a connec-
tion between the value of the object and the value of the subject, the predomi-
nance of a certain convention not only involved political and discursive power 
(and history) but epistemology as well. It may even be worthwhile to link this 
to Michel Foucault’s so-called Renaissance-episteme, in which the secrets of 
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the world could be deciphered through objects and artefacts which always led 
towards the same truth, just as words did. In any event, I very much sympathize 
with the idea of Michel Callon and others that economic (and political) theory 
has helped shape economic practices and instruments – including the funda-
mental conventions involved (Callon 1998a, 1998b; Callon, Millo & Muniesa 
2007). Connecting this perspective to a long term historical view moreover 
allows for a more thorough understanding of conventions, including the very 
definition of what a convention is.  
From an economic perspective, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
witnessed a shift from intrinsic value to design and decoration as important 
ingredients of product quality. While Guerzoni has pointed to the emergence of 
splendor as a new form of investment related to ostentation, Jan De Vries 
(2008) in particular has described a shift from ‘old luxury’ to ‘new luxury’, i.e. 
from a situation in which the value of a product derived from the value/quality 
of the raw materials used to one in which invention, newness and fashion 
played a more prominent role. While old luxury products had a long life cycle 
and a long-lasting worth (for instance on second hand markets), new luxuries 
were subject to a faster de-appreciation. This process appears to have been 
related to new views on artisanal labour. Enlightened thinkers at the same time 
developed new views on artisanal labour and skills. While the growing impor-
tance of invention and ‘ingenium’ may have been beneficial for some artisans 
and artists, the importance of the mechanical arts was stressed, among others in 
the famous Encyclopédie of Diderot and D’Alembert. Looking at it more 
closely however, it becomes clear that artisanal skills became instrumentalized 
(Koepp 1980; Sewell 1980; Schaffer 1999). On the one hand, guilds became 
discredited in a discourse on the need to disclose the ‘mysteries of the trade’. 
Enlightened thinkers apparently lost the capacity to understand the mysterious 
character of skills and technical knowledge other than through the grid of a 
cartel of entrepreneurs jealously guarding their knowledge and refusing en-
trance to outsiders. On the other hand, labour and skills came to be placed on 
equal footing with machinery and instruments. Scholars such as Adam Smith 
and others attempted to make skills public, but in this process were decompo-
sing them analytically. Artisans were reduced to a type of very sophisticated 
robots in the end.  
In the long run, this process appears to have been related to one of labour 
disappearing from the public scene altogether. While the guilds’ political 
power gradually became obsolete due to processes of state formation, the ar-
tisanal presence in the public realm waned. The ‘traditional’ processions and 
parades lost their importance and attractiveness (in part because of certain 
processes of appropriation from the part of urban elites). Perhaps more impor-
tant the character of the rituals changed from practices in which supernatural 
‘presences’ were created into practices that ‘communicated’ and ‘represented’ 
something (Muir 1997). Artisanal labour may even have become less visible in 
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a literal sense. At least in service sectors guild-based masters had often worked 
at the front side of their houses. They were even obliged to do so with a view 
on customers and guild officials being able to guard the working process and 
prevent fraud – while working in cellars, at attics or simply at the back of the 
house was associated with trickery and cheating. Long term structural eco-
nomic transformations such as proletarianization and the so-called ‘retail-
revolution’ resulted in manufacturing moving away from the front of the house 
in the course of the early modern period (De Munck, 2010a, 41). While masters 
increasingly worked as subcontractors or even employees to other masters, a 
category of ‘faiseurs de rien, vendeurs de tout’ emerged who displayed and 
sold goods at the front of the house (Mui & Mui 1989; Blondé et al. 2005, 
2006). These goods, if not imported, were manufactured elsewhere, for exam-
ple at the back of another house by a proletarianized master working for piece 
rates to a wholesaler. 
Although this may give the impression that these transformation can be un-
derstood from a mere socio-economic perspective, a political and epistemo-
logical perspective may again be needed in order to understand this adequately. 
What happened from the perspective of product value is the disappearance of 
the link between product quality and the political status of the manufacturing 
masters. Whenever the ‘intrinsic convention’ applied, product quality was 
guaranteed by the political standing of the manufacturing masters. The link 
between intrinsic value and the political and ethical position of the master 
materialized in the collective hall mark – which referred to the city as a context 
and could only be applied by a regular master – i.e. a manufacturer who had 
finished his mandatory apprenticeship term and made a master piece. In a mod-
ern fashion system, however, a product’s ‘quality’ derives from the product’s 
place among a series or a taxonomy of products. Or else it became depended on 
an external discourse on product quality, to be found in catalogues, trade cards, 
shops signs, advertisements and so on. This is what took place in the long run. 
While the guilds disappeared and labour retreated from the public realm, goods 
became displayed and ranked in shops and warehouses (Walsh 1995; Hann & 
Stobart 2005; additional references in Van Damme 2007a). And while the 
guilds’ collective hall marks became obsolete, the products’ value was con-
structed through modern trade marks and advertisement strategies (McKen-
drick, 1960, 1982; Robinson 1963; Walsh 2000; Van Damme 2010). 
3. Convention Theories, Post-structuralism and Latour 
Now how to connect this to the current state of the art on product quality and 
conventions? Can this shift be framed in the model of Boltanski and Thévenot, 
which was subsequently adopted by Eymard-Duvernay? Was there a shift from 
domestic and industrial conventions to something related to a ‘cité mar-
chande’? Did the collective rules and conventions (related to product quality) 
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of the so-called ‘monde civique’ disappear or did they rather emerge (in the 
realm of labour relations) in the nineteenth century? And what about the 
‘monde inspiré’? Should we connect this to intrinsic value (the spiritual pres-
ence in matter) or rather to the genius of nineteenth-century designers and 
artists? In my opinion, these models fail to capture adequately the shift which 
concerns us here. To the extent that the transformation sketched above can be 
seen as a shift from an ‘économie de l’offre’ to an ‘économie de la demande’ 
(Minard 1998, 160) there may be a growing similarity with the so-called ‘con-
vention marchande’. After all, consumer preferences and the price mechanism 
may have become more important as a frame of reference for the assessment of 
products. But this of course does not prevent ‘orders of worth’ from being 
historically and culturally contingent. Nor were competition, opportunism, 
calculation and the price mechanism absent in early modern guild-based indus-
tries. Economic historians may even be inclined to associate a more ‘classical’ 
market mechanism to the prominence of intrinsic value. After all, cultural 
elements became more rather than less important as a factor in the price of 
products from the eighteenth century on.  
What appears to have happened, then, was a shift from a ‘regulated’ to a 
‘deliberated’ quality (Minard 2010), but this shift was related to new ways of 
‘knowing’ product quality. To date, the precise historical processes involved 
are not entirely understood – while connoisseurship could shift from manufac-
turing masters to retailers (e.g., Van Damme 2007b, 2010), the object of 
knowledge is said to have shifted from (the appearance of) products to the 
production process (Reddy 1988) – but it is in any case clear that epistemic 
transformations should be considered in future research. My work on guilds in 
the Low Countries points to a shift which materialized across industrial sectors. 
Given the epistemic character of this shift, the work of Boltanski and Thévenot 
should in my opinion be complemented with the insights of Michel Foucault 
and Bruno Latour (see Diaz-Bone 2009 for an introduction and additional 
references). The value of products becoming dependent on either the place of 
the product among a taxonomy of products or of an external discourse on prod-
uct quality is remarkably similar to the Foucauldian shift from a Renaissance to 
a classical episteme. According to Foucault (1966, 1969) truth became some-
thing man-made. From mid-seventeenth-century on truth was the result of 
taxonomies or discourses built by man, while the spiritual presence of god (in 
matter) disappeared. The so-called scientific revolution was of course an im-
portant watershed in this respect. Philosophers and artisans alike were involved 
in a process in which observation and experiment became important in the 
construction of ‘matters of fact’. While the portentous nature of prodigies – 
which often took the shape of body-like ‘things’ such as monstrous birds, oddly 
shaped animals and the like – were intensely discussed under the influence of 
religious turmoil in the sixteenth and first half of the seventeenth centuries, the 
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preternatural marvels of nature were gradually naturalized subsequently (Das-
ton 1994). 
To cut a long story short, the transformations guild-based artisans were sub-
ject to may have been part of a broader ‘disenchantment’ in which the material 
world was increasingly seen as passive matter subject only to natural laws. In 
the terms of Bruno Latour (1991, 1999), this may be seen as a ‘purification 
process’, in which objects or nature lost all ‘agency’ while subjects (scientists) 
constructed the myth of humans being autonomous actors detached from ob-
jects. This process may in turn be linked to the disappearance of the connection 
between product quality and the political standing of (the body of) the artisan. 
While the intrinsic value of gifts and other material goods was closely linked to 
the (moral) ‘quality’ of the spender in humanistic discourse in Renaissance 
Italy, guild-based artisans connected the intrinsic value to their political stand-
ing through apprenticeship rules and trade marks. What happened in the long 
run was the disappearance of this link, as a result of the guilds being abolished 
or their products being outcompeted by products without hall marks. In my 
view, this points to a fundamental restructuring of the object-subject-
relationship. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, human subjugation to 
the magical powers of objects gradually came to be seen as a sort of fetishism 
that stood in diametric opposition to the emancipation process that is associated 
with the scientific revolution and enlightenment. In the same vein, the subject’s 
relationship with language and symbols is historically contingent. In western 
intellectual history, the idea took root, that humans master their language. 
While ‘primitive people’ appear to subjugate themselves to language in rituals 
and ceremonies – in which certain phrases are for example repeated until a 
state of trance is reached – nineteenth and twentieth-century missionaries 
boasted their ability to use language sincerely, as a genuine expression of the 
intimate self (Keane 2002, 2007). 
In reality, language is of course a historical construction as well. Perhaps not 
coincidentally, language as we understand it today may have its roots in the 
seventeenth century too. The Saussurian distinction between the (material) 
signifier and the (ideal) signified has been traced back to John Locke, among 
others. While for Locke the relationship between sign and meaning was seen as 
something conventional (without a natural or necessary connection between 
them) the linguistic sign came to be seen as the representation of a pre-
linguistic idea – and hence, of something mental (Aarsleff 1982). In this sense, 
scientific views up to and including post-structuralism, may result from a pro-
cess in which the intrinsic value of labour and the connection thereof with the 
political claims of artisans via products and hall marks became discredited. 
Hence, the importance of linking epistemic shifts to changing economic prac-
tices. While Callon and others have studied the impact of economic theories 
and models upon daily economic practices in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, others have pointed to the relationship between ‘the archaeology of 
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knowledge’ and the emergence of political economy in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth century (Vigo de Lima 2010). Perhaps it is time now to connect a 
Foucauldian approach to the early modern artisans’ views and attitudes. 
For the time being, I am not sure whether to see the disappearance of ‘intrin-
sic value’ as a kind of ‘disembeddedness’ or rather an ‘overdertermination’ of 
markets, but from the perspective of the artisans involved, it must in any case 
have had the effect of a certain ‘alienation’ – without, however, understanding 
alienation in the Marxist sense. My source material suggests that guild-based 
artisans did not fear loss of control over the means of production. They did not 
resist being paid in raw materials or selling all their output at piece rates to one 
and the same merchant. What they resisted was illegal entrepreneurs selling 
products either without trade marks or with trade marks but without it being 
clear what the trade mark referred to. For instance, they resisted the formation 
of companies between a regular master and an entrepreneur who was not a 
member of the guild – because it enabled the entrepreneur to use the master’s 
mark while employing the latter in reality. In the same vein, they feared the 
activities of masters’ widows, who could often lend the deceased master’s hall 
mark to an illegal entrepreneur (who might even marry her in order to escape 
apprenticeship requirements) (De Munck, 2007b, 2008, 2010a). In other words, 
regular masters were opposed to the separation of product quality and their own 
moral and political quality. 
It could also be a fruitful idea, therefore, to frame this with the gift-concept 
in subsequent research (De Munck 2011b). From a gift perspective, products 
(gifts) convey the ‘spirit of the giver’, which is in turn connected to the latter’s 
social status, prestige and political standing. What guild-based masters did with 
their hall marks, from this perspective, was to imprint their ‘spirit’ onto the 
product, and hence, implicitly claiming something in return from either their 
customers or the merchants they sold their products to. These products, in this 
sense, were not entirely commodified, nor can they be seen as disinterested 
works of art (as Marxist theory would enforce us to do). Instead, they could be 
seen as a type of gift, which up to a certain degree possessed the quality of a 
heirloom, as their value depended on the prestige of the previous owner (in this 
case the producer). Labour relations (e.g. the relation between masters and 
merchants) or buyer-seller relations (e.g. when a customer brings his own tex-
tile fabrics to a tailor) could in extension be seen as a type of patronage rela-
tionships. Conventions, in this context, must have functioned very differently 
when compared to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries – although similar 
relationships may of course exist there as well. 
Conclusion 
From the perspective of markets becoming disembedded or overdetermined, 
the heterodox view on ‘conventions’ should be qualified. There are of course 
 117
different conventions in different market segments and socio-political, geo-
graphical and chronological contexts, but we should be wary not to conceal 
fundamental historical transformations across market segments and so-called 
‘mondes’. In a long term diachronical perspective markets became a reified 
reality – or rather: an intellectual construction in which products were entirely 
commodified and the artisanal body instrumentalized. This becomes clear when 
zeroing in on the discursive practices and conventions of guild-based manufac-
turing artisans in (NW-)Europe. What they implicitly agreed on was the impor-
tance of intrinsic value in a product, which was expressed in their collective 
hall marks and linked to the urban political and a broader intellectual context at 
the same time. Of course, while this may have been limited to so called ‘strong 
guilds’, in which masters held the reins, and although it is likely to have been 
influenced by the cities’ level of autonomy, it must nonetheless have been 
embedded in a firm mental frame. While intrinsic value (the value of silver, 
gold and, in extension, raw materials) can be seen as the very fundament of 
mercantilist thinking, it enabled guild-based master to link their (urban) politi-
cal standing to the value of their products. Their collective hall marks, which 
guaranteed a standardized product quality to customers, were only to be used 
by artisans who had finished an apprenticeship term and had become a burgher 
to the city.  
From the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries, this appears to have 
changed drastically. The gradual but profound severance of product quality on 
the one hand and the moral and political standing of manufacturing masters on 
the other may in part have been a consequence of changing labour relations and 
processes of state formation, but intellectual and epistemic transformations 
would seem to have been more important. While intrinsic value as a convention 
appears to have been connected to the idea of matter possessing mysterious, 
religious and creative powers in itself, natural philosophers and artisans natu-
ralized matter from the seventeenth century on. In their wake, enlightened 
thinkers decomposed the ‘mysteries of the trade’ and, in the event, instrumen-
talized the artisanal skills and bodies. In the terms of Bruno Latour, this could 
be seen as a sort of purification process, in which agency became to be located 
exclusively in a Cartesian subject, which attached value to objects visually and 
discursively. As I see it, this history should be taken into account when discuss-
ing the nature, characteristics and definition of conventions.  
Several conceptual problems surface when taking a historical point of view 
seriously. How did the role and functions of ‘objects’ (Boltanski & Thévenot 
1989, 1991; Batifoulier & Thévenon 2001, 248-250) in the attribution of status 
change in the long run? How to understand the possible impact of the disap-
pearance of patronage relations, the long term shift from gift-exchange to mar-
ket-exchange and from guild-based hall marks to modern brands, trade marks 
and advertising? How did it change the networks and translation processes 
which attributed agency to humans and artefacts? How was the so-called ‘sa-
 118
voir collectif’ related to intrinsic value and the early modern apprenticeship 
system and how did apprenticeship transform when intrinsic value disqualified 
and skills became instrumentalized? How, in the end, were conventions pro-
duced? Could it be that this was farther removed from game theoretical models 
and (bounded) rationality in the late middle ages than it is today (if only be-
cause of the religious doctrines of the ‘just price’)? Whatever the case may be, 
given the historical impact of the social sciences on economic reality, econo-
mists, sociologists and historians should continue thinking very cautiously 
about definitions, models and transformations. Above all, they should continue 
to address them from a long term and interdisciplinary perspective. 
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